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Faith, Autonomy, and the Limits of 
Agency in a Secular Age 
 
Philip J. Rossi 






The autonomy of individual human agents, particularly when 
construed as the capacity to govern freely one’s own actions, has often 
served as a principal marker of the cultures of Western modernity. 
Whether one is, in Charles Taylor’s terms, a “booster” or a “knocker” 
of modernity, individual autonomy looms large as a defining feature of 
what each recognizes as a characteristically modern account of what it 
means to be human. Yet, even though autonomy has taken center 
stage in modernity, it is useful to recall that modern thinkers were not 
the first to construe self-governance of one’s actions as an important 
ingredient in the exercise of morally responsible human agency.1 
Once we attend to the fact that a capacity for self-governance is 
central to traditions of moral discourse and reflection that focus on 
virtue and character as structurally constitutive of moral agency, the 
emergence of autonomy as a core element in the dynamics of 
modernity can no longer be considered to issue primarily from an 
insight totally original with “modernity” about the form, operation, or 
capacity of human agency.2 In this respect, the emphasis the ethics of 
modernity places on autonomy may not be so much a major break 
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from previous ways of construing agency as it is a significant 
enhancement of a role that the moral traditions from which the ethics 
of modernity emerged had already given to responsible self-
governance within the structure of moral agency. 
 
Kant, whose work plays a formative role in placing responsibility 
for one’s own self-governance at center stage of discussions of moral 
agency, is instructive on this point: In his seminal treatment of 
autonomy in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals he explicitly 
presents his account as nothing more than a precise articulation of a 
principle which every agent already grasps, as a matter of practical 
knowledge, in acting morally.3 This principle bears upon the manner in 
which the exercise of moral agency carries within its very form a 
commitment to order one’s actions to unconditioned good, i.e., to that 
good which requires, under penalty of rendering one’s agency 
practically unintelligible, unconditional recognition by all rational 
agents.4 
 
Why might it be significant to point out that, even as autonomy 
has served as a defining marker of moral agency for the cultures of 
modernity (and remains so in the aftermath of modernity), it has 
fundamental antecedents in traditions of understanding human agency 
that antedate the modernity that gives autonomy such prominence? In 
what follows, I argue that understanding autonomy within a context 
locating its continuity with the long stream of moral reflection that 
Alan Donagan designates “the common morality”5 is significant for two 
reasons. First, it allows us to see how it need not be the case that 
autonomy is inevitably packaged with the “isms”—e.g., individualism, 
relativism, subjectivism—that the “knockers” of modernity have 
inveighed against, and, often enough, “boosters” of modernity have 
celebrated among its glories. Second, dislodging autonomy from its 
presumed home in the dynamics of social atomism and resituating it 
as embedded in a mutual recognition of agency that is expressed in 
practices of social respect6 provides a basis for a different construal of 
its relation to faith. In accord with this proposed social reading of 
autonomy, I will then show how faith, understood as an affirmation of 
an order of transcendence that makes possible the robust exercise of 
human moral finitude, may be construed to offer to the structure and 
workings of autonomous moral agency a formative social context that 
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is particularly fitting for moral engagement with a secular age’s 
fracturing interplay of contingency.  
 
Making the case for the first reason is the task of Part I. This 
involves exploring the social dimensions of Kant’s account of moral 
agency that, long overlooked in many standard twentieth 
century readings of his ethics, have now been highlighted in a 
significant body of scholarship published since the mid-1980s.7 Taking 
these social dimensions into account, I argue, provides a basis for re-
contextualizing the role of autonomy in the dynamics of modernity in a 
way that brings into question that part of the influential “subtraction” 
narratives according to which the unfolding of modernity and secularity 
has inexorably required the elimination of transcendence and the end 
of religious faith. Such re-contextualization challenges narratives that 
take autonomy as a fitting and, indeed, necessary trope for human 
emancipation from God and from demands upon moral action indexed 
to a transcendent order; it offers, instead, an account of autonomy in 
which God’s transcendence renders intelligible an unreserved 
affirmation of the full dignity and worth of the finitude of human 
agency On a reading that attends to the social embedding of human 
autonomy as a necessary condition for its intelligibility and exercise, 
autonomy does not inevitably set humanity as a whole, nor individual 
human agents, in a zero-sum agential competition with one another 
(or, for that matter, with a transcendent God) in order for it to 
function as the origin and ground of the principles of moral life.8 
Indeed, it may be the case that humans can be properly autonomous 
only to the extent that the exercise of their autonomy carries within it 
an affirmation of moral normativity that is not merely immanent to 
human subjectivity but is referenced to an order that can be 
legitimately designated as “objective” as well as “transcendent.” 
 
This social re-contextualization of autonomy has consequences 
both for a larger recasting of the narratives of modernity and 
secularity and for the efforts of this volume to articulate how faith9 
can engage the socio-political order of a secular age. Such re-
contextualization places in question those narratives of modernity and 
secularity that frame autonomy as the paradigmatic form of human 
moral agency that inevitably eventuates in intractable opposition to 
faith as a locus for principles for morally responsible conduct. In 
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contrast, this social re-contextualization does not take it to be the case 
that autonomy inevitably stands in incompatible rivalry to faith as a 
principle for the integrity of moral agency, nor that faith necessarily 
functions as a heteronomous principle for moral agency. While it is of 
major importance eventually to address this kind of “meta” question—
and Taylor’s work provides a range of strategies for doing so—that 
task is not the primary one for this essay. That task, instead, is to 
show how a socially robust understanding of autonomy bears upon 
articulating possibilities for how moral agency, as reflectively formed in 
a community in which faith enters the formative dynamics of agency, 
appropriately engages pressing issues in the socio-political order. Such 
possibilities for engagement should thus manifest the structural 
capacity of an autonomous agency formed in faith to provide the 
sphere of public discourse with responsible analyses and critiques of 
these issues and constructive approaches for their resolution. 
 
Part II of this essay will thus explore these possibilities, which 
presuppose a reading of autonomy and faith as both embedded in a 
mutual recognition of agency (in Kant’s terms, the relation that agents 
bear to one another in “a kingdom of ends” or an “ethical 
commonwealth”) that is expressed in practices of social respect.10 In 
accord with this reading of autonomy, I will show how faith may be 
construed so that it offers to autonomous agency a formative social 
context that is particularly apt for responding to the moral challenges 
posed by the fracturing interplay of contingency that marks a secular 
age. This section will thus articulate a construal of faith in terms of 
the enlarged social context it provides for the exercise of an autonomy 
already referenced to practices of mutual recognition. I will argue that 
faith offers to the social respect embedded in the structure of 
autonomy an expansive horizon of welcoming of the other that brings 
social respect to a completion fully inclusive of the range of otherness 
before which our humanity stands. 
 
I. The Finitude of Human Agency: The Commonwealth of 
Autonomous Subjects in the Space of Contingency 
 
In many readings of the intellectual trajectory of modernity and 
secularity, Kant’s articulation of autonomy as crucial to human moral 
agency plays a prominent role. Although Descartes is most often 
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credited (and castigated) for fathering “the turn to the subject,” this 
modern subject reaches full moral “adulthood” only as Kant makes it 
possible for the subject to claim reflectively its own “autonomy of the 
will” as “the supreme moral principle” for decision and conduct. It may 
be an historical and conceptual oversimplification to argue that Kant’s 
account of autonomy transposes the Cartesian “I think, therefore I 
am” into “I will, therefore I am,” but Kant’s uncompromising 
affirmation of the human subject’s moral freedom has, nonetheless, 
often been read as providing moral subjectivity with a contour of self-
determining agency that brings the chaos of moral relativism 
inevitably in its wake. Embedded in such relativism, moreover, seems 
to be an agential subjectivity that radically challenges any moral claim 
made on behalf of a transcendent authority. On this reading, Kantian 
autonomy begets a modern Protagorean relativism well suited to a 
secular age in which God has been pronounced dead: Autonomy frees 
each of us to decree what is right and what is good with a moral 
authority once the prerogative of God.11 
 
Iris Murdoch concluded her classic description of autonomy, 
read as a cipher for an absolute moral subjectivism willfully displacing 
God, with the devastating comment: “Kant’s [autonomous] man had 
already received a glorious incarnation nearly a century earlier in the 
work of Milton: His proper name is Lucifer.”12 More recently, Susan 
Neiman, who does not read Kant as a relativist nor take his account of 
autonomy to entail relativism, characterized the robustness with which 
Kant affirms the autonomy of human freedom in terms that strikingly 
resonate with Murdoch’s association of autonomy with godlike power. 
Commenting on the “universal law of nature” formulation of the 
categorical imperative, she notes “Universal laws can be imagined by 
anyone; universal laws of nature are given by one Being alone. In 
giving us this formula, Kant gave us a chance to pretend to be God. 
Every time we face a moral dilemma, we are to imagine re-enacting 
the Creation.”13 
 
On Neiman’s reading, however, “playing God” in a Kantian 
manner does not require us to place human agency in rivalry with 
divine agency; it requires, instead, a recognition that fundamental to 
the integrity of our human moral situation is the acknowledgment of 
both the difference and the affinity between divine and human agency. 
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That twofold acknowledgment then bears upon our capacity to 
envision what human moral agency requires of us. She sees this 
recognition as crucial to Kant’s articulation of the limits of theoretical 
reason and the consequences those limits have for exercising practical 
reason to shape our conduct: “Dissatisfaction [with the limits of our 
knowledge] comes from the wish to be God. If any one claim is the 
message of Kant’s metaphysics, this is it”14…“The desire to surpass our 
limits is as essential to the structure of the human as the recognition 
that we cannot.”15 On her account, the “wish to be God” does not, in 
the first instance, stem from a will to exercise omnipotent power on 
one’s own behalf; it arises from an experiential apprehension of the 
depth to which contingency, as it escapes both our capacity for 
understanding and the control of our finite agency, shapes the 
trajectory of our lives: “Yet the wish to determine the world can’t be 
coherently limited, for you cannot know which event will turn out to be 
not just another event, but the one that will change your life”16…“The 
wish to be God isn’t simply pathological; its alternative is blind trust in 
the world to work as it should.”17 
 
Neiman’s reading of the moral autonomy expressed in “the law 
of nature” formulation takes on added significance for articulating the 
place of human agency in a secular age once we note her placement of 
the exercise of autonomy within Kant’s overall depiction of our human 
situation, which he sees as inextricably tied to reason’s efforts to 
render that situation intelligible, theoretically and practically, with 
respect both to nature and to God. For Kant, contingency, and our 
recognition of human finitude with respect to that contingency, are 
central for the dynamics that give our human situation its moral and 
its religious structure. He situates the operation of human autonomy 
within the framework of a contingency, embedded in the workings of 
both the cosmos and our agency, that serves as a marker for both the 
limits of finite reason and the dynamism driving reason to surpass 
those limits. On this reading of Kant, contingency presents no puzzle 
for the use of our reason that, by seeking the principles at work in the 
operations of nature, enables us to make sense of the world 
theoretically: “Where it’s only a matter of knowledge, the fact that 
what affects us is not created by us causes little problem.”18 Matters 
stand differently, however, for our practical use of reason that seeks to 
render ourselves and the world in which we must act morally 
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intelligible: “It would be easy to acknowledge that not controlling the 
world is part of being human, were it not for the fact that things go 
wrong. The thought that the rift between reason and nature is neither 
error nor punishment but the fault line along which the universe is 
structured can be a source of perfect terror.”19 
 
Behind the “wish to be God” thus lies a desire to rid the world of 
the contingent, a desire that Neiman sees framing the central goal of 
Hegel’s enterprise, even as Kant, on her reading, finds such a desire 
both unavoidable and deeply problematic.20 It is problematic inasmuch 
as Kant takes a capacity to conceal from ourselves the recognition that 
we cannot surpass the limits of our human finitude to be embedded 
within the structure of the human just as deeply as the wish to be 
God: “Kant reminds us as often as possible of all that God can do and 
all that we cannot. Nobody in the history of philosophy was more 
aware of the number of ways we can forget it. He was equally 
conscious of the temptation to idolatry, the alternative route to 
confusing God with other beings.”21 Such inveterate capacity for self-
concealment of our limitation in the face of human reason’s 
unbridled ambitions is precisely why our reason needs a discipline of 
“critique” to train us in an intellectual humility from which we can 
acknowledge that the dignity properly ours as human is inestimable 
precisely in virtue of, not in spite of, our finitude. Kant recognizes that 
our finitude is so deeply constitutive of the moral shape of human 
agency that, were we to convince ourselves that we had succeeded in 
overcoming the moral limits of our finitude, we would not thereby have 
made our agency more “godly”; we would, instead, have deflated its 
capacity to engage the play of contingency that stands at the core of 
the human moral enterprise. 
 
If Neiman’s reading is correct, she has identified a contrast 
between Kant and Hegel that is crucial both for locating the different 
influences their work has had on shaping the cultures of modernity and 
for discerning how their work may—and may not—continue to provide 
useful coordinates for navigating the aftermath of modernity in which 
we find ourselves. Kant affirms, as Hegel does not, that the proper 
relation between human finitude and divine transcendence is one that, 
from the side of finite human reason, maintains, rather than seeks to 
overcome, the difference between the finite in its full contingency and 
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the transcendent in its fully radical and non-contingent otherness. On 
Kant’s account, it is only in virtue of recognizing the difference 
between the human and the divine—a recognition, moreover, that 
acknowledges that overcoming that difference is not within our human 
power—that it becomes possible for us to act in full and proper accord 
with our human finitude. Human agency can be exercised in a fully 
human manner only in function of an awareness and an affirmation—
often exacted from us neither readily nor easily—that the “godly” 
perspective presented to us as a “universal law of nature” for our finite 
agency to “enact” as pattern for our moral maxims does not thereby 
enable us to act with an unfailingly omnipotent “godly” power of 
doing “whatever we might wish.” That perspective enables us, rather, 
to exercise a properly finite human power to do as we ought in a world 
that contingency shapes.22 
 
This contrast, in my judgment, renders Kant a more helpful ally 
than Hegel for articulating the proper contours for understanding the 
significance of the exercise of human agency in a secular/post-secular 
age that poses fundamental challenges to the possibility and 
intelligibility of faith as an appropriate human response to a 
transcendence properly construed as divine. Neiman’s reading of this 
contrast parses Kant’s account by attending to its affirmation of 
finitude and contingency as that which provides human agency with its 
fundamental moral range and depth, in contrast to Hegel’s affirmation 
of the impetus to overcome them. This parsing helps to show how a 
construal of the relationship between divine freedom and human 
autonomy that pits them against one another as a “zero-sum” game 
may miss both how radically different they are from each other and 
why that difference is central for appropriately understanding what it is 
to be human. One consequence of missing such a difference is that the 
human freedom left as a legacy after the rival God has been declared 
dead turns out to be small change indeed for any who expect 
humanity thereby to gain moral capital sufficient to make the workings 
of the world more reliably conducive to the flourishing of all. Inasmuch 
as the obituary pronouncing God dead is also the news that God never 
was, there now is one less suspect to blame when human things go 
terribly amiss; that, however, hardly provides a guarantee that, in 
consequence of a recognition of the (long-time) absence of God, we 
have made our human selves better prepared, either now or for the 
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future, to “do right” for the flourishing of our species and the 
environing world in which we dwell. As Neiman astutely points out in 
concluding her chapter on Nietzsche and Freud, the outcome of their 
unmasking of the God-illusion is that “the price is enormous, for all 
nature stands condemned. Human beings themselves become walking 
indictments of creation.”23 
 
Neiman is not the first to note that the death of God provides 
impetus for lines of antihumanist thinking that consciously stand 
against the centrality that the main currents of modernity give to the 
human. The value of her analysis here lies not so much in the fact that 
she makes this connection, but rather in her presentation of Kant as 
champion of the utter centrality of human finitude to the integrity and 
worth of the human moral endeavor. Kant’s account of autonomy 
provides support for lines of resistance to the anti-humanist and post-
human options that, in consequence of both real and perceived failures 
of modernity, have become part of the landscape of the intellectual 
culture of the early twenty-first century.24 Kant’s account offers a basis 
for constructing positive alternatives to such options, alternatives that 
open possibilities for more adequately addressing, in theory and in 
practice, crucial ways in which the forms and dynamics of modernity 
have failed to deliver on their once bright promises to bring about 
human flourishing. Modernity’s articulation of a reflective awareness of 
historicity may justly merit condemnation for making possible its self-
conscious appropriation—and even approbation—of humanity’s agency 
as prime executioner at history’s slaughter-bench. This does not 
require, nonetheless, that the alternative human future be either of 
the main possibilities post-humanism puts on offer: on one hand, 
numb resignation to the fate of being a transient epiphenomenon of 
the dynamics of the cosmos; on the other, the hubris of relentlessly 
seeking mastery of the techniques and the technology to bend the 
cosmos—or at least our local part of it—to serve wherever may now 
be, or in the future emerge, as our dominant human goal and 
purposes.25 
 
Central to this line of resistance, as well as to the possibilities 
for articulating an alternative robustly affirming the human, is an 
appropriation and enlargement of key elements in Kant’s account of 
the relationship that contingency bears to the exercise of autonomy 
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within the community of human finite agents. This relationship, as I 
argue below, first makes it possible to bring into full relief the extent 
to which impoverished understandings of both the human and the 
divine function within such post and anti-humanist options. It also 
makes it possible to articulate alternatives that stand open to 
disclosure of what Taylor describes as the hope instanced (though 
not exclusively) in “Judeo-Christian theism and in its central promise 
of a divine affirmation of the human, more total than humans can ever 
attain unaided.”26 
 
On this reading, Kant situates the mutuality of our human 
freedom—or, alternately, the reciprocity of our autonomy—as fully 
engaged with the contingency of the cosmos, even as it also marks the 
moral locus in which we are mutually enabled to transcend it. His 
account manifests a deep sense that the common fragility of finite 
human freedom stands inextricably coordinate to the dignity that we 
must recognize in one another’s humanity in the moral community he 
terms the “ethical commonwealth.” These elements function within a 
reading of autonomy in which awareness of the reciprocal connections 
of freely offered respect within which one stands to all other human 
agents—in Kant’s terms, awareness of one’s membership in a 
“kingdom of ends”—brings with it a deep sense of the fragility of our 
finite freedom. This fragility, I will argue, is exhibited in the exercise of 
a finite freedom inextricably enmeshed in the functioning of a world of 
contingency, and thus serves as fundamental locus for recognition of 
the dignity of our humanity that we are called upon to accord to one 
another. 
 
Briefly framed, my argument is that Kant’s recognition of the 
inestimable dignity of the power of human freedom to effect good (i.e., 
for bringing about “what ought to be” in a world of “what is”) is equally 
a recognition that such power resides in agents who are themselves 
profoundly fragile, whose exercise of that power is correspondingly 
fragile, yet who are capable of empowering each other’s freedom in 
mutual respect for one another’s fragility.27 For Kant, the fragility of 
human freedom is inscribed in the embodied conditions of spatio-
temporal finitude and contingency. The human power for bringing 
about good thoroughly pertains to, and is rooted in, a finite practical 
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reason, exercised in a world of contingency that renders that power for 
bringing about good both fragmentary and fragile. Such fragmentary 
and fragile character is not simply an outcome arising from the limited 
scope of the good we each have power to effect; it also arises to the 
extent that the endurance of much of the good that we each actually 
effect requires that others also do what is needed to sustain it. Kant 
recognizes that, insofar as we each stand alone, the exercise of our 
freedom provides thin and tenuous protection to our core dignity of 
spirit in a world in which the contingency of things gone wrong 
intersects with a finite agency that lacks power—and, even more 
significantly, the willingness—to effect all that is good. 
 
The ultimate bulwark for our finitude is then not so much the 
solitary resoluteness that Murdoch eloquently describes as it is the 
mutual recognition and respect we accord each other for the fragile 
and vulnerable freedom we each embody. As embodied, moreover, our 
freedom is rendered fragile not simply by the inconstancy of intention 
that Kant terms the “inversion of our maxims,” nor only by the 
inattention and distraction with which we thoughtlessly descend into 
evil’s banality, nor by an intent so thoroughly malign that Kant calls it 
“diabolical” to mark it as beyond human (im)moral capacity. It is also 
rendered fragile by a vulnerability of both body and spirit to violence 
and violation. Such vulnerability provides a crucial locus from which to 
gain a perspective upon the welcoming hospitality to the other that, as 
I shall propose in the next section, constitutes a fundamental social 
context within which faith can be constitutively formative of the 
agency required for responsible human engagement with the 
fragmented world inherited from modernity. 
 
Let me finish this section of my discussion by framing three 
major points it has proposed about the structure and exercise of 
human moral agency. These points follow from indexing Kant’s 
account of autonomy not, as is done in standard narratives of 
modernity, to an anthropology of atomistic agency, but rather to what 
I call a “social anthropology of human finite freedom.” The first 
point is that Kant’s account of autonomy functions within a social 
embedding of human agency that is conceived as a structural feature 
of human finitude. This point would have once been controversial 
among Kant scholars, but a significant body of recent scholarship has 
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marshaled an array of interpretive and historical considerations in its 
favor. This point has significance beyond indicating a need for 
reconsidering the role Kant’s work often plays in accounts of the 
emergence of those liberalisms formative of modern moral 
individualism.28 Of wider importance than such historical revisionism is 
that, once the historical and conceptual legitimacy of a social construal 
of autonomy is established, we may then reconfigure–or even put 
aside—some bifurcations that the “standard” narratives of modernity 
and secularity associate with autonomy, particularly those placing 
it on the side of the radical moral subjectivity and individualism 
captured in Murdoch’s reference to Milton’s Lucifer or the warfare of 
the “state of nature” that Hobbes posits as the abiding baseline of 
human social dynamics. 
 
The second and third points then bear upon the relationship 
between, on the one hand, the social construal of the structure and 
exercise of autonomous agency and, on the other, the conceptual and 
moral functions that a recognition of divine transcendence plays within 
a human world of contingency and finitude. 
 
The second point is that this social construal of autonomy 
repositions the moral import of an acknowledgment of divine 
transcendence: such acknowledgment, rather than undermining 
human agency, instead encompasses a robust sense of human social 
and historical responsibility. It provides a basis for affirming a 
fundamental moral priority for the role of humanity, as a mutually 
interrelated whole, in shaping the social and cultural history that forms 
the distinctively human mode of interaction with the cosmos.29 
Acknowledging divine transcendence fully affirms human moral 
responsibility for shaping the direction of history and culture. 
 
The third point is that re-contextualizing autonomy so that 
social relationality is fundamental to its exercise, shows it to be 
embedded in the contingencies of the cosmos and human culture that 
mark our human finitude. This embedding of autonomy in contingency 
will provide, in the next section, a central locus for the mutual social 
engagement of autonomy and faith.  
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As with the first point, the latter points each have a dimension 
that bears upon the value of Kant’s work as a locus for constructive 
theological engagement, as well as a dimension that bears upon 
questions about the role of faith in public life. To the extent that Kant 
can now be read as providing an account in which an acknowledgment 
of divine transcendence affirms human moral responsibility in the 
shaping of history, he no longer stands as an “adversary,” who, in 
opposing affirmations of divine transcendence issuing from faith, is 
intent upon thoroughly replacing religion by secular human moral 
practice. His work can now be engaged constructively in relation to 
faith in that it affirms faith as a human posture toward transcendence, 
one that plays a legitimate constitutive role in shaping autonomous 
moral agency.30 Kant’s account is thus an effort not to overcome or 
eliminate religion and faith but to exhibit how faith, construed as a 
critically formed acknowledgement of divine transcendence, is of 
crucial import for the proper exercise of human moral agency.31 Such a 
critical acknowledgment of transcendence, shaped in awareness of 
“the limits of human reason,” provides the context for rendering 
human finitude, exercised as autonomous agency in a world of 
contingency, morally intelligible. Kant takes the human relation to 
divine transcendence to be that which provides the moral space for 
human finite agency to be constitutive—though not solely by itself—of 
the trajectory and outcome of history by working to establish a world 
community abidingly shaped by the dynamics of the moral reciprocity 
of mutual respect. 
 
In addition to re-opening possibilities for Kant as a constructive 
theological interlocutor, these points also bear upon the function of 
faith in the public life of cultures emergent in the aftermath of 
modernity. They help delimit the scope and the configuration of human 
responsibility for giving a morally fitting direction to the trajectory of 
the socially structured dynamics of public life and culture. Kant aptly 
characterizes these dynamics as humanity’s “unsocial sociability,”32 
which provides the cultural conditions under which human finite 
agency is exercised for effecting good and resisting evil. In situating 
the exercise of human moral autonomy in the contingency of both the 
cosmos and the workings of human agency, Kant’s account manifests 
a deep sense that the common fragility of our finite human freedom, 
which runs all the way down in our agency, stands inextricably 
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coordinate to the dignity that we must recognize in one another’s 
humanity in the moral community he terms the “ethical 
commonwealth.” 
 
A relationality deeply embedded in the contingencies of the 
cosmos and of our human fragility is thus a key element in a Kantian 
anthropology that inscribes human freedom in the embodied 
conditions of spatio-temporal finitude. Insofar as we each stand alone, 
our finitude provides thin and tenuous protection to our core dignity of 
spirit; under these conditions, human power for bringing about good, 
rooted in the fragmentary, fragile exercise of finite reason, stands on 
the slender and precarious footing of a social relationality embedded in 
cosmic contingency. Human fragility stands aware that, in this world of 
contingency, it cannot of itself, either individually or communally, 
provide enduring stability for an order of what “ought to be,” the order 
that fully accords with the dignity and the fragility of our human 
embodied spirit. 
 
This awareness, critically shaped by acknowledgment of both 
divine transcendence and human finitude, nonetheless brings with it a 
two-fold hope enabling us to envision ourselves as responsible agents 
shaping the trajectory of history and culture. One element of this hope 
is that what we do autonomously (or differently inflected, what we do 
in enacting the dignity of our finitude) will have genuine effect in 
helping to bring about an enduring order of what ought to be. 
The second element is that the stability of such enduring order of what 
“ought to be,” even though it lies beyond human finite power to effect 
fully in a world of contingency, constantly stands on offer to us, in 
virtue of the moral efficacy of our critically formed acknowledgement 
of divine transcendence, as the one outcome fully worthy of all we 
enact autonomously from the dignity of our finitude.33 
 
This interplay of contingency and hope in relation to a critical 
construal of human finitude and divine transcendence pervades Kant’s 
philosophical enterprise. The role it plays, moreover, in his account of 
cosmopolitanism and perpetual peace as worldly enactments of the 
dignity of our autonomous finitude, provides a particularly apt place 
from which to make a transition to a discussion of the role of faith in 
the public life of a secular age. These accounts help delimit how a 
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critically formed acknowledgment of divine transcendence frames a 
horizon of hope that is not just personally but also socially necessary 
for finite human agents to persevere in efforts to make the world of 
human interaction “what it ought to be,” i.e., a world in which human 
agents concretely and consistently exhibit the dynamics of shared 
membership in “a kingdom of ends.”34 Such hope is necessary 
inasmuch as human efforts to make the world into what “it ought to 
be” take place in and for a world in which the recalcitrance of the 
contingency of “what is” lies so deeply ingrained that it seems to rule 
out as unintelligible hopes for the attainment of a social order of 
enduring moral reciprocity. For Kant, the prime instance requiring such 
(social) perseverance lies in a commitment to establish an 
international order of enduring peace, even in the face of the 
recalcitrance of human self-preferential obduracy that seems to 
support Hobbes’s image of ceaseless war as the baseline for human 
social dynamics. Kant marks the moral urgency of establishing an 
international order of enduring peace by identifying it as a categorical 
imperative that humanity must enjoin upon itself as a species.35 His 
urgency in pressing this point suggests that sustaining efforts in 
pursuit of a cosmopolitan order of peace is a project within our human 
capacity to effect only in virtue of a hope that, embedded in the critical 
self-awareness of human moral finitude, brings with it an 
acknowledgment of transcendence. 
 
Kant presses the case for humanity to enact a moral 
commitment to a cosmopolitan order of peace within an 
anthropological horizon shaped by an acknowledgement of 
transcendent otherness and human finitude. The final section of this 
essay will thus engage the question of the role of faith in public life by 
placing the dynamics of the “unsocial sociability” of our human 
finitude, as they are enacted in the interplay between our embodied 
vulnerability and what Taylor has called “the draw to violence,”36 
within that horizon of transcendent otherness and human finitude. I 
will propose that one fundamental way in which faith makes it possible 
for us to resist the draw to violence lies in its capacity for enabling an 
encompassing respect for our shared embodied vulnerability. Faith 
provides a locus for a human enacting of the primal grace by which the 
divine fully enters the fractured landscape of human contingency: a 
hospitality in which the welcoming of one another’s otherness becomes 
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so complete that it allows us to accompany each other in and through 
the brokenness that marks out the space of human contingency. 
 
II. Enlarging of the Framework of Agency: Faith 
and the Welcoming of Otherness 
 
In this concluding section I argue that faith, construed as that 
openness from which humans are empowered to stand in finitude and 
contingency before the transcendent Otherness of God, offers to the 
structure and workings of autonomous moral agency a formative social 
context that is particularly fitting for engaging a secular age marked 
by the fracturing dynamics of contingency. Faith, on the account 
offered here, provides a horizon for recognition of the full range of 
otherness—divine, cosmic, and human—within which autonomous 
agents are invited to enact, for a world of fracture, modes of healing 
unity that do not erase the fragmentation and brokenness of 
contingency into an undifferentiated Hegelian Aufhebung but, instead, 
render brokenness in all its particularities into graced loci for bringing 
about reconciliation. 
 
This argument for faith’s possibilities for empowering an 
enlarged social context for the exercise of autonomous agency builds 
upon, first, a social reading of autonomy as embedded in a mutual 
recognition of agency and expressed in practices of social respect and, 
second, the multiple horizons of otherness that have come into view 
from the interplay of the dynamics of fracture in the aftermath of 
modernity. As a counterpart to this social reading of autonomy, I will 
articulate a construal of faith that, in its capacity for attending to the 
full range of otherness, provides an enlarged social context for an 
autonomous agency referenced to practices of mutual recognition. 
Faith, construed this way, offers to the social respect embedded in the 
structure of autonomy an enlarged horizon of welcoming the other, 
from which our agency is invited to bring social respect to completion 
in an inclusive hospitality of reconciliation that engages the full range 
of otherness in which our fractured and fragile humanity stands and 
participates. In so doing, faith opens possibilities for our agency to 
shape practices for resisting the draw to violence that all too often 
infects us in encountering one another’s otherness. 
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The construal of faith proposed here is thus one for which 
hospitality—a trope aptly captured in George Steiner’s remark, “I 
believe we must teach other human beings to be guests of each 
other”37—is the enacted form of the relationality fundamental to the 
bearing that faith has upon agency.38 Particularly helpful for setting 
the context for this construal is a counter-trope to hospitality that 
Neiman has elegantly proposed as a fitting characterization of the 
fragile and deeply fractured dynamics in which humanity seeks moral 
and spiritual intelligibility in a “post-modern” condition: “homeless.” 
Neiman’s trope puts in bleak terms the consequences of modernity’s 
disenchantment of the world, which renders the workings nature of 
void of meaning, save in terms an efficient causality absent of 
purpose, upon which human instrumental rationality only arbitrarily 
gains purchase. We—at least to the extent that modernity remains 
deeply etched into our bearing toward the world—now live and act in a 
world of nature fully disenchanted of purposes that pay attention to 
humanity; even more ominously, we live and act in a world in which 
we have become acutely aware of how thoroughly capable we have 
become of disenchanting and disengaging ourselves from attention to 
our own humanity. “Homeless” captures a sense that we act within a 
landscape where not only an indifferent nature fractures human 
purposes, but also where something fundamental in ourselves and in 
the exercise of our agency has itself been deeply fractured. She 
remarks: “Auschwitz revealed the remoteness of humans from 
themselves”39 and adds that “Auschwitz was conceptually devastating 
because it revealed a possibility in human nature that we 
hoped not to see.”40 
 
There is a connection that links these coordinates provided by 
Neiman’s trope of “homeless,” a construal of faith through a trope of 
“welcoming,” and a social reading of autonomy. This connection is in 
the dynamics of mutuality within which each of these coordinates are 
embedded, particularly as mutuality functions in the multiple spaces 
and varied inflections of cosmic and human contingency.41 Through 
this connection of mutuality functioning in the spaces of contingency, 
faith offers autonomous agency a capacity for entering into a wider 
horizon of engaging otherness, where such engagement can be 
enacted as a fully encompassing hospitality.42 
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Viewed from this connection in mutuality, Neiman’s trope of 
“homeless” exhibits a moral poignancy that powerfully exposes our 
individual and systemic failures to exhibit to one another the basic 
human reciprocity of mutual welcome in hospitality. The conditions of 
living with one another that we have helped shape (sometimes 
actively, sometimes by acquiescence) in civic life, in the marketplace, 
in the dynamics of religion and of culture, which should be ones 
conducive to the flourishing of all, have all-too-often been ones we 
have misshaped (as much by inattention as by illintent) to one 
another’s detriment. At the outset of the twenty-first century, the 
dynamics of so many interactions within our dominant socio-cultural, 
political, and economic structures provide scant evidence from which 
to glean firm assurance that we, as a species, have yet learned how to 
make the space on which we dwell a fitting “home” for one another as 
fellow humans, let alone for other living beings with whom we share 
the earth. We seem to provide to one another, in the social worlds we 
construct to affirm “our” identity over against “theirs,” little to suggest 
that we have mastered the skills to share, in a modicum of peace, 
even a small space side by side with fellow human beings who are not 
the “us” delimited in our parochialisms. Inscribed deep in our failures, 
great and small, to welcome the displaced, the uprooted, the 
homeless, as well as in the license we often give ourselves to drive 
strangers away with coldness, hostility and even violence, is a refusal 
to recognize that we, too, stand “homeless” in our human condition 
and that, as George Steiner pointedly remarks, all of us “are guests of 
life on this crowded polluted planet.”43 Unsure of how welcome we 
truly are in the world, even when we stand in a privileged place, our 
welcome for others falters, lest opening the door to them bring with it 
contingencies that might displace us as well. 
 
Although Neiman offers what looks like an unrelievedly bleak 
depiction of our human condition as “metaphysically homeless,” she 
still affirms, in accord with a Kantian trajectory of hope, the capacity of 
moral reason to empower human imagination for reshaping “the world 
as it is” into “the world as it ought to be” and so enact, for and with 
one another, some human wholeness for our world. Her account also 
aligns with Kant’s articulation of hope as the moral horizon of 
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reason in affirming that the human project of rendering the world 
morally intelligible by enacting what ought to be is sustained only by 
an ordering to a point of reference—an encompassing “ideal” 
of the highest good—that functions “transcendentally.” This ideal 
frames a trajectory of intelligibility for moral endeavor that is more 
encompassing than whatever can be rendered out of any mere 
juxtaposition of the fragments of human action from which we seek to 
exact moral sense.44  
 
Neiman’s philosophical grammar for this function, it must be 
noted, is robustly apophatic—as was Kant’s—with respect to what 
modernity has perceived as an incurably onto-theological grammar of 
orthodoxy in Christian theology’s affirmation of a transcendent God. 
Though not identical to “faith” as I construe it in terms of hospitality 
and welcome, Neiman’s reading of “hope” does take a dynamic of 
human accompaniment to be central to the attainment of whatever 
human wholeness we have the capacity to effect for one another 
through our agency. In this she captures a central dimension of Kant’s 
cosmopolitan vision pointing us toward the enlargement of mutuality— 
particularly in circumstances in which possibilities for mutuality seem 
deeply broken or even erased—as a fundamental horizon for sustaining 
the exercise of our agency.45 
 
Neiman’s construal of hope locates its moral function in the 
attention we pay to the mutuality of our common condition of being 
“homeless.” Hope, as the readiness to accompany one another, 
particularly in the most shattering circumstances, provides a 
fundamental pattern for exhibiting how attention to our mutuality 
empowers us to open for one another a welcoming human space upon 
which we can dwell with each other in a manner that makes that space 
worthy to be called “home.” In following a trajectory that attends to 
the moral profundity of human accompaniment Neiman’s account 
points in a direction along which we may also plot important 
dimensions of a construal of faith indexed to the trope of hospitality. 
 
Hope, in Neiman’s account, is an enacted trajectory of human 
accompaniment—of making the world “home” for each other—that 
provides the fundamental horizon of moral intelligibility from which to 
engage our “homeless” human circumstances. It thereby provides a 
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frame of reference for concluding my account of faith by pointing to 
two important points along its trajectory from which faith can be seen 
taking form as an “enacted hospitality” of accompaniment. In the first 
instance, faith is a response acknowledging the gifted character of 
creation as “the hospitality of God.” In accord with this account, the 
most fundamental form of “faith” is the hospitality of divine enactment 
in the radical originating that brings to be, and continues to sustain, 
the dwelling place that is creation itself. This faith has its origin in 
God; it is a faith God enacts in the encompassing bringing-to-be that is 
creation and that makes creation a “dwelling place.” Creation may 
itself thus be viewed as a divine “making room” in which God’s 
welcome is given to the abundance of all that God creates. 
 
This dynamic is deeply embedded in the Genesis narrative (Ch 
3-4) that eventuates in what Christian theology has long seen, well 
before modernity, as a primal instance of the fracturing that renders 
us “homeless.” God, the most gracious host, invites the man and the 
woman, fashioned in God’s image, to make the garden, expressive of 
the abundance of God’s creation, their dwelling place. Yet within that 
abundant hospitality, the man and the women make themselves 
ungracious guests: They attempt to seize for themselves what is 
received rightly only if accepted in response to the Creator’s 
graciousness. The narrative then makes manifest that 
acknowledgment and acceptance of creation as the radically 
originating offer of divine hospitality is a condition for the possibility of 
our human enactments of mutuality. So it is altogether fitting that the 
next fractures narrated fray and then break the deepest bonds of 
human mutuality: The man and the woman set themselves at odds 
with one another in passing off blame; far more ominously, Cain, 
perceiving no divine welcoming for himself, sunders in brutal murder 
his fraternal bond with Abel. 
 
The Genesis narrative provides the negative articulation of what 
is most appropriately construed as the positive relation between the 
first, originating dimension of faith as the “enacted hospitality” of 
God’s accompaniment of creation, and the second, received dimension 
of that faith to empower human agency with a capacity to enact 
hospitality for one another. Our recognition and affirmation of the 
most fundamental form of hospitality as the divine enactment by which 
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we now stand as “guests of creation” is what makes it possible for us 
to enact the human hospitality by which we become “guests of one 
another” in acknowledgment of our mutuality. 
 
It may well be that attention to this fundamental relation 
between these two dimensions of faith as “enacted hospitality” lies 
behind the importance that many religious traditions attach to 
practices in which human solidarity is enacted by welcoming the 
stranger at our door. In these practices we learn how our human 
status in the world is marked by mutual vulnerability to one another, 
all the more so when we meet as strangers to one another. 
Hospitality–at least as it has been enacted in the religiously informed 
practices of many cultures–is thus far more than a civil, wary, 
politeness that allows us to maintain those barriers between “us” and 
“them” that are transgressed at peril. It is, instead, the enacted risk of 
greeting another’s vulnerability out of our own–and a reciprocal 
acceptance of that enacted risk by the one welcomed. Such welcoming 
opens up a previously unimagined common ground of mutuality that 
allows each of us to stand upon a new space of respect issuing from a 
mutual recognition of vulnerability.46 
 
Faith, on this construal, thus takes form as recognition of the 
horizon of a divine hospitality that welcomes us into the space of 
creation and thereby empowers us to make that space home for 
one another.47 In a “secular age” in which so much public space 
functions as a place for a zero-sum contention of narrow interests and 
“take-no-prisoners” protection of what are all-too-often parochial and 
tribal identities, making room for welcoming one another in mutual 
vulnerability presents a compelling challenge to our capacities to 
exercise agency in full accord with the mutuality that gives agency its 
fundamental moral shape. In that context, what I have articulated in 
this section is an argument for the role of faith, as enacted hospitality, 
in giving our autonomous agency a capacity to address this challenge 
to the mutuality that lies at the heart of its moral exercise. In that 
role, faith provides a horizon of divine hospitality welcoming us to the 
space of creation, so that we may, by our hospitality to one another, 
attend to the deep fractures of our “metaphysically homeless” human 
condition in ways that allow creation of spaces of mutuality in which 
we can enact together what is needed for the overcoming of fracture. 
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“Faith,” on the reading I am proposing here, creates a space of 
possibilities for us to act with one another, even as we ourselves are 
fractured, to heal the fractures of the world. It provides our agency 
with a horizon of possibilities for enacting, through welcoming one 
another in mutual vulnerability, a more encompassing wholeness to 
our humanity and for our world. In a world in which “hospitality” to the 
movement of capital resources, armaments, and instrumentally 
commodified information has become more valued—and far easier to 
“enact”—than hospitality to one’s brother and sister human beings in 
their often desperate vulnerability, encouraging a hospitality of mutual 
vulnerability may even seem foolish and dangerous. Yet it may very 
well be that only in the folly of hospitality will we be enabled to 
recognize and articulate the mutual vulnerability that, at least as much 




1See, for instance, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, chapter 5, 1113b-
1115a; Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Book III, Lectures XI-XIII; Duns Scotus, “The Will and Its 
Inclinations,” in Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Wolter, Allan B., 
OFM, ed. and trans., Washington, DC: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1986, pp. 188-191, 194-197, 200-203 (I thank James 
South for directing me to these texts of Scotus). 
2 This point may also be articulated as a construal of moral agency in terms of 
the accountability that agential self-governance entails for shaping and 
directing one’s conduct. The articulation of autonomy emerging in 
modernity can thus be understood as reconfiguring the scope of 
accountability: agents are now explicitly and reflexively accountable 
for the normativity of their moral judgments as well as for their 
conduct. Agential accountability for normativity, however, does not 
thereby render it, as one influential line of criticism has it, merely 
“subjective.” 
3 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals in Immanuel Kant, Practical 
Philosophy, trans. and ed., Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of 
the Works of Immanuel Kant Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996, pp. 58-59. [German: in Kants gesammelte Schriften, 
herausgegeben von der königlich preussischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, Berlin 1904-, Bd. 4:403-404; hereafter KGS.] In this 
regard, the thrust of his argument is not principally against theoretical 
moral skepticism but against practical exemptions from the moral 
order that we are inclined to enact for our own benefit. 
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4 See, for instance, Stephen Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge: A 
Study of the Categorical Imperative, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2009, pp. 124-127, 155-159, 167-178. 
5 The Theory of Morality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, pp. 4-9; 
this classic study explores commonalities in the moral theories of 
Aquinas and Kant. 
6 This way of reading autonomy cuts against the grain of certain renderings of 
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implicated in a larger discussion of the relation between the divine and 
the human. 
26 Sources of the Self, p. 521. 
27 I have developed this point in “Finite Freedom, Fractured and Fragile: 
Kant’s Anthropology as Resource for a Postmodern Theology of Grace,” 
Philosophie et théologie: Festschrift Emilio Brito, SJ, Bibliotheca 
Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, 206, ed. Éric Gaziaux, 
Leuven: Peeters Press, 2007: 47-60; see especially Part III, 54-60. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
At the Limits of the Secular, (2014): pg. 226-249. Publisher Link. This article is © William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 
25 
 
28 This is not to deny the formative role that influential interpretations of 
Kant’s work that discounted or ignored the social embedding of 
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Valerio Rohden, Ricardo R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida, and Margit 
Ruffing, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008: 65-75; “Cosmopolitanism: 
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41 See Rossi, “Human Contingency, Divine Freedom, and the Normative Shape 
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Lieven Boeve and Terrence Merrigan, Leuven: Peeters Press 
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the other the intra-cosmic contingency of uncertain outcome. 
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